Thomas Wentworth Higginson, 1890
1 The
opinion of the philosophers perhaps seems to some to be a
paradox; but still let us
examine as well as we can, if it is true that it is
possible to do everything both with
caution and with
confidence. For
caution seems to be in a manner
contrary to
confidence, and contraries are in no way
consistent. That which seems too many to be a
paradox in the
matter under
consideration in my
opinion is of this kind: if we asserted that we ought to
employ caution and
confidence in the same things, men
might justly
accuse us of bringing together things which cannot be
united. But now where is the
difficulty in what is said? For if these things are true, which have been often said and often proved, that the
nature of good is in the use of appearances, and the
nature of
evil likewise, and that things
independent of our will do not
admit either the
nature of
evil nor of good, what
paradox do the philosophers
assert if they say that where things are not
dependent on the will, there you should
employ confidence, but where they are
dependent on the will, there you should
employ caution? For if the bad consists in a bad
exercise of the will,
caution ought only to be used where things are
dependent on the will. But if things
independent of the will and not in our
power are nothing to us, with
respect to these we must
employ confidence; and
thus we shall both be
cautious and
confident, and indeed
confident because of our
caution. For by employing
caution towards things which are really bad, it will
result that we shall have
confidence with
respect to things which are not so.
2 We are then in the
condition of deer; when they
flee from the huntsmen’s feathers in fright, whither do they turn and in what do they
seek refuge as safe? They turn to the nets, and
thus they
perish by confounding things which are objects of fear with things that they ought not to fear. Thus we also act: in what cases do we fear? In things which are
independent of the will. In what cases on the
contrary do we
behave with
confidence, as if there were no danger? In things
dependent on the will. To be deceived then, or to act rashly, or shamelessly or with
base desire to
seek something, does not
concern us at all, if we only hit the mark in things which are
independent of our will. But where there is death, or
exile or pain or
infamy, there we
attempt to run away, there we are struck with
terror. Therefore as we may expect it to happen with those who
err in the greatest matters, we
convert natural confidence (that is,
according to
nature) into
audacity,
desperation, rashness, shamelessness; and we
convert natural caution and
modesty into
cowardice and meanness, which are full of fear and
confusion. For if a man should
transfer caution to those things in which the will may be exercised and the acts of the will, he will
immediately by willing to be
cautious have also the
power of avoiding what he chooses: but if he transfers it to the things which are not in his
power and will, and
attempt to
avoid the things which are in the
power of others, he will of
necessity fear, he will be
unstable, he will be disturbed. For death or pain is not
formidable, but the fear of pain or death.