Beauty hath usually been said to
consist in
certain proportions of parts. On considering the
matter, I have great
reason to
doubt, whether beauty be at all an idea belonging to
proportion. Proportion relates almost
wholly to
convenience, as every idea of order seems to do; and it must therefore be
considered as a
creature of the
understanding, rather than a
primary cause acting on the senses and
imagination. It is not by the
force of long
attention and
inquiry that we find any
object to be beautiful; beauty demands no
assistance from our reasoning; even the will is unconcerned; the
appearance of beauty as effectually causes some
degree of love in us, as the
application of ice or fire produces the ideas of
heat or cold. To
gain something like a
satisfactory conclusion in this point, it were well to
examine what
proportion is; since
several who make use of that word do not always seem to
understand very clearly the
force of the
term, nor to have very
distinct ideas concerning the thing itself. Proportion is the
measure of
relative quantity. Since all
quantity is
divisible, it is
evident that every
distinct part into which any
quantity is divided must bear some
relation to the other parts, or to the whole. These relations give an
origin to the idea of
proportion. They are discovered by mensuration, and they are the objects of mathematical
inquiry. But whether any part of any
determinate quantity be a fourth, or a fifth, or a sixth, or a
moiety of the whole; or whether it be of
equal length with any other part, or double its
length, or but one half, is a
matter merely indifferent to the
mind; it stands neuter in the question: and it is from this
absolute indifference and tranquillity of the
mind, that mathematical speculations
derive some of their most
considerable advantages; because there is nothing to
interest the
imagination; because the
judgment sits free and unbiassed to
examine the point. All proportions, every
arrangement of
quantity, is alike to the
understanding, because the same truths
result to it from all; from greater, from lesser, from
equality and
inequality. But surely beauty is no idea belonging to mensuration; nor has it anything to do with
calculation and
geometry. If it had, we
might then point out some
certain measures which we could
demonstrate to be beautiful, either as simply
considered, or as related to others; and we could call in those
natural objects, for whose beauty we have no
voucher but the sense, to this happy
standard, and
confirm the voice of our passions by the
determination of our
reason. But since we have not this help, let us see whether
proportion can in any sense be
considered as the
cause of beauty, as hath been so generally, and, by some, so confidently affirmed. If
proportion be one of the constituents of beauty, it must
derive that
power either from some
natural properties
inherent in
certain measures, which
operate mechanically; from the
operation of
custom; or from the
fitness which some measures have to answer some
particular ends of conveniency.
Our business therefore is to
inquire, whether the parts of those objects, which are found beautiful in the vegetable or animal kingdoms, are constantly so formed
according to such
certain measures, as may
serve to
satisfy us that their beauty results from those measures, on the
principle of a
natural mechanical cause; or from
custom; or, in fine, from their
fitness for any
determinate purposes. I
intend to
examine this point under each of these heads in their order. But before I
proceed further, I hope it will not be
thought amiss, if I lay down the rules which governed me in this
inquiry, and which have misled me in it, if I have gone
astray. 1. If two bodies
produce the same or a
similar effect on the
mind, and on
examination they are found to
agree in some of their properties, and to
differ in others; the
common effect is to be attributed to the properties in which they
agree, and not to those in which they
differ. 2. Not to
account for the
effect of a
natural object from the
effect of an
artificial object. 3. Not to
account for the
effect of any
natural object from a
conclusion of our
reason concerning its uses, if a
natural cause may be assigned. 4. Not to
admit any
determinate quantity, or any
relation of
quantity, as the
cause of a
certain effect, if the
effect is produced by
different or
opposite measures and relations; or if these measures and relations may
exist, and yet the
effect may not be produced.
These are the rules which I have
chiefly followed, whilst I examined into the
power of
proportion considered as a
natural cause; and these, if he thinks them just, I
request the reader to
carry with him
throughout the following
discussion; whilst we
inquire, in the first place, in what things we find this
quality of beauty; next, to see whether in these we can find any assignable proportions in such a manner as ought to
convince us that our idea of beauty results from them. We shall
consider this pleasing
power as it appears in vegetables, in the
inferior animals, and in man. Turning our eyes to the vegetable
creation, we find nothing there so beautiful as flowers; but flowers are almost of every sort of
shape, and of every sort of
disposition; they are turned and fashioned into an
infinite variety of forms; and from these forms botanists have given them their names, which are almost as
various. What
proportion do we
discover between the stalks and the leaves of flowers, or between the leaves and the pistils? How does the
slender stalk of the rose
agree with the
bulky head under which it bends? but the rose is a beautiful flower; and can we
undertake to say that it does not owe a great deal of its beauty even to that
disproportion; the rose is a large flower, yet it grows upon a small
shrub; the flower of the apple is very small, and grows upon a large tree; yet the rose and the apple
blossom are both beautiful, and the plants that bear them are most engagingly attired,
notwithstanding this
disproportion. What by
general consent is allowed to be a more beautiful
object than an orange-tree, nourishing at once with its leaves, its blossoms, and its fruit? but it is in
vain that we
search here for any
proportion between the
height, the
breadth, or anything else concerning the dimensions of the whole, or concerning the
relation of the
particular parts to each other. I
grant that we may
observe in many flowers something of a regular
figure, and of a
methodical disposition of the leaves. The rose has such a
figure and such a
disposition of its petals; but in an
oblique view, when this
figure is in a good
measure lost, and the order of the leaves
confounded, it yet retains its beauty; the rose is even more beautiful before it is full blown; in the
bud; before this
exact figure is formed; and this is not the only
instance wherein
method and exactness, the
soul of
proportion, are found rather
prejudicial than
serviceable to the
cause of beauty.